Working with Child Deprivation Cases in Georgia's Juvenile Courts
A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR
SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
A. STANDARD OF PROOF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR TERMINATION
The Georgia Juvenile Code has set forth four basic situations where a petition
for the termination of parental rights is clearly appropriate:
- the parent has given written consent, acknowledged before the court, to the
termination of his/her parental rights with respect to the child, such as in
a case where the parent places the child up for adoption;
- a decree has been entered by a court ordering the parent to support the
child and the parent has wantonly and willfully failed to comply with the order
for a period of 12 months or longer;
- the parent has either abandoned the child or left the child in a situation
that the identity of the parent cannot be determined after a diligent search
and the parent has not come forward to claim the child within three months of
his/her finding;
- the court makes a finding of parental misconduct or inability.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-81(b)(1-4).
According to the Georgia Juvenile Code, the court can only order the termination
of parental rights by finding with clear and convincing evidence that the parent
in question falls into one of the categories set forth above. O.C.G.A. §
15-11-81(a). Even if the court finds justification for termination, the court
cannot terminate a parent's rights unless such action would be in the best
interest of the child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional,
and moral condition and needs of the child who is the subject of the proceeding,
including the need of that child for a secure and stable home. O.C.G.A. §
15-11-81(a).
This is a high standard for the petitioner to overcome. A decision to terminate
parental rights is held to a very high standard which is taken very seriously
by the appellate courts. "Seldom does the state wield so awesome a power
as when it permanently ends the family ties between parent and child."
R.C.N. v. State of Ga., 141 Ga. App. 490, 491 (1977). "The tearing
of the flesh of one's offspring is a penalty by the state second in severity
or arguable surpassing in severity, only to depriving a person of his or her
liberty." Nix v. Dep't of Human Resources, 236 Ga. 794, 795 (1976).
It is not sufficient by itself for termination to be in the "best interest"
of the child or that the child might be better off in another environment. Carvalho
v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 94 (1981). A finding of unfitness must be made based on
a review of whether the parent can care for the child alone without the necessity
of state intervention. A termination cannot be granted simply because the child
might find better "financial, education or even moral advantages elsewhere."
Id., at 95.
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